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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction of this appeal under the
provisions of Section 78-2-2(3)(j) Utah Code Ann. (1989) and
Rule 3(a) of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the entry of Amended Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and an Amended Judgment entered by the
Honorable VeNoy Christoffersen, First Judicial District Judge,
following a remand by the Utah Supreme Court.
Roller, 758 P.2d 919 (Utah 1988).

See Cornish v.

Upon remand, the trial court

amended paragraph 5 of its Findings of Fact regarding the
location of Evan 0. and Marlene B. Roller's ("Rollers") tap
into the Cornish Town ("Cornish") water line.

The court also

made other revisions and modifications to the Findings of Fact
at the request of counsel for Rollers.

On December 15, 1988,

the court entered Amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law
and an Amended Judgment incorporating revisions thereto advanced
by both plaintiff and defendant.

Written objections were made

to Amended Finding of Fact No. 5 by Rollers.

The trial court

denied Roller's motion objecting to the entry of the Amended
Findings of Fact.

The Rollers thereafter filed a Notice of

Appeal.
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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issue presented on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in modifying its Findings of Fact to further interpret
the deed and further clarify the obligation of Cornish with
respect to the deed.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
This is an appeal from an amended final judgment and

specifically from Amended Finding of Fact No. 5 entered by the
First Judicial District Court on December 15, 1988.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition at the District

Court.
In 1979, Cornish initiated an action against the
Kollers to determine the ownership of culinary water used by
Cornish and the Kollers from springs situated on the Kollers1
property.

The case was tried to the court without a jury on

February 16, 17 and 18, 1983.

Findings of Fact, Conclusions of

Law and a Judgment were entered on April 26, 1984.

The trial

court found that Cornish had the right to determine whether
Kollers should be supplied water from the town's water supply
or from the spring from which Rollers1 reservation of use in a
deed was made.
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Rollers appealed, inter alia, this finding of the district
court.

On appeal, this Court affirmed the trial court relative

to all issues except the finding of the trial court relative to
the source from which the Rollers1 water must be supplied.

This

Court held that the Rollers' predecessors reserved in themselves
rights in the water which was the subject of the conveyance by
deed, namely, the water flowing from the Pearson Spring.
at 921.

Ld.

The Court found that Cornish must provide Rollers with

water from the Pearson Spring and not other sources of water
and remanded the matter to the district court.

Following the

remand, the present dispute between the parties, which is the
subject of this appeal, arose in the course of proposed
amendments to the Findings of Fact.

A detailed description of

this dispute is set forth in the Statement of Facts, which
follows.
C.

Statement of Facts.

The disagreement over water rights between Cornish and the
Rollers is long-standing.

Although the trial court entered

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in this case on
April 26, 1984, the trial court continued to exercise
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jurisdiction over various aspects of this case during the
pendency of the appeal.1
Following the remand by this Court, the trial court held a
further hearing on November 15, 1988.

In the morning, the court

held an evidentiary hearing with respect to the effect of the
court1s prior ruling in its August 30, 1988 Memorandum Decision
that the Rollers replace the two-inch pipe with a one-inch
pipe.

Rollers put on evidence about various issues involving

the size of the pipe and pressure requirements. (See Transcript
of Hearing, November 15, 1988, 10:00 a.m., p. 1-92)

^•For example, on August 21, 1987, Rollers filed a motion for
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction which
was later heard. (See Motion for Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction dated August 21, 1987) On July 12,
1988, Cornish sought further clarification from the court
regarding the extent of Roller's water rights and sought by
motion for permanent injunction to have the court establish
some quantifiable limit on the amount of Rollers1 use of water
from the-Pearson and Griffiths Springs. (See Motion for
Permanent Injunction, dated July 12, 1989) This motion did not
seek to disturb the order on appeal to this Court but involved
different issues. On July 26, 1989, Rollers filed a motion to
dismiss the motion for permanent injunction. (See Defendants1
Motion to Dismiss and memorandum of Law, dated July 26, 1988)
The trial court also held an evidentiary hearing on these
motions during the pendency of the appeal. In a Memorandum
Decision dated August 30, 1989, the court granted the Town's
motion for an injunction to the extent that the Rollers were
ordered to restore the Griffith Spring source back to where it
was at the time they were granted a right to tap that supply.
(See Court's Memorandum Decision, entered August 30, 1988)
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During the afternoon of November 15, 1988, the court heard
argument about the proposed amendments to the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and objections thereto.

Contrary to

Rollers statement of facts, the Rollers proposed substantive
amendments to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law which
were not simply attempts to correct "clerical error."

(See

Rollers Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and
Cornish's Objections to Defendants Proposed Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law; see illustratively paragraphs 3, 14,
16, 17, 21 and 27 of the proposed findings of fact; and paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the proposed conclusions of law.) Cornish
objected to certain of these proposed amendments and the court
made its rulings on the record.

(See Transcript of Hearing on

November 15, 1988, 3:00 p.m. (hereinafter "Transcript") p.1-55)
At the hearing, counsel for Cornish orally moved to make an
additional finding of fact clarifying where the tap for the
diversion of water to the Rollers is required to be located
based upon the language of the deed.

(Transcript, p. 5)

Counsel for Rollers objected to this motion on the grounds that
it had not been brought prior to the hearing.

The court

indicated that it would prefer to resolve the issue at that
time.

(Transcript, p. 5)

Cornish pointed out that the deed simply states:

"Grantors

reserve the right to use water for human drinking and stock

-5-

watering purposes.

This use to be confined to a water flow

through a 3/4" tap, and grantee agrees to pipe the said water
to the home of Lars Pearson for culinary and domestic
purposes."

(See Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, p. 4)

Cornish argued that the deed was silent on where

the 3/4 inch tap had to be placed vis-a-vis the home.
Furthermore, it argued the Supreme Court's decision did not
address this issue but merely required that Cornish provide the
required water from the Pearson Spring.

Cornish indicated that

it wanted to place the tap at a different location on the brow
of a hill as part of a new diversion box that would accomplish
both the diversion of the one-fifth interest Rollers were
entitled to and provide for the tap at the same time.
(Transcript, pp. 6-8)

Rollers objected to this amendment,

arguing that Cornish was obligated to furnish the tap at the
home of Lars Pearson (now Rollers ) and that the court
previously made a finding of fact that the tap was to be 50
feet west of the residence.

(Transcript, pp. 7, 19)

The court observed that the fact the tap was located 50
feet west of the residence was not a finding of where the tap
had to be located but merely reflected where the parties told
the court the tap was located at the time of the original
proceeding.

(Transcript, p. 18) The court found that Cornish

was only required to provide a 3/4 inch tap and that tap had to
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come out of the Pearson Spring, but that the tap was not required to be located 50 feet west of the residence.
(Transcript, p. 5, 18-20)
After hearing the argument of both sides and making its
ruling, the court thereafter added language to the end of
paragraph 5 of the original Findings of Fact.

Paragraph 5 of

the Amended Findings of Fact now states:
5.
Defendants1 Predecessor in interest reserved
the right to use water for human drinking and stock
watering purposes. This use to be confined to a water
flow through a 3/4 inch tap and Grantees (Cornish)
agreed to pipe the said water to the home of Lars
Pearson, Defendants predecessor, for culinary and
domestic purposes. All water to be measured through a
culinary water meter. The tap is presently situated
approximately 50 feet West of the Defendants
residence. However, as long as Cornish provides the
water through a 3/4 inch tap from the Pearson Spring,
that complies with the deed, regardless of where the
tap is located in relation to the residence.
(Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, entered
December*15, 1989 - Language which was added by the court and
is the subject of this appeal emphasized.)
The Rollers filed a notice of appeal on January 12, 1989
from the district court's judgment entered on December 15,
1989.

Specifically, the Rollers appealed from the district

court's addition of the above-referenced language to paragraph
5 of the Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
When the district court amended Finding of Fact No. 5 to
address the location of the tap, it determined an issue not
previously raised by the parties.

The court appropriately

interpreted the deed with respect to the issue of whether it
required the tap to be located 50 feet west of the residence.
The court had power, on remand, to make this additional finding
since it was not inconsistent with the mandate of this Court.
The district court's judgment should be affirmed; it clearly
acted within its power in making the additional finding.

The

Rollers1 arguments that Cornish is collaterally estopped from
raising this issue, or that law of the case, or procedural
rules were violated are erroneous.

Collateral estoppel does

not apply since there was not a prior final judgment, and even
if there was, the issue of the location of the tap was not
previously considered and certainly not actually litigated
before.

Law of the case likewise does not apply since it only

relates to issues previously determined.

The mere reference by

the court in 1984 in its original Findings of Fact, to the
presently existing fact of the location of the tap, did not
constitute a determination of whether the deed required the tap
to be located at that spot.

The Rollers1 reliance on

procedural rules is also misplaced since the Rollers had an
opportunity to present their arguments at the November 15, 1988
hearing and the court gave them a full opportunity to be heard.
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Finally, in the alternative, even if this Court determines that
a final judgment was present and the court could not make
additional findings on remand, the trial court had power under
Rule 60(b) to grant the relief requested by Cornish.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE TRIAL COURT
SINCE THE TRIAL COURT CLEARLY ACTED WITHIN
ITS POWER IN MAKING ADDITIONAL FACTUAL
FINDINGS AFTER REMAND
The Rollers contend that the trial court had no authority
to enter the additional finding of fact it made at the hearing
on November 15, 1988 when, at that same hearing, Rollers
suggested numerous changes in the Findings of Fact and Judgment
that were clearly of the same type and nature as that suggested
by Cornish.

Many of the changes proposed by Rollers were not

merely "clerical errors", as they contend, nor had they any
relationship to the subject matter of the appeal remanded from
the Utah Supreme Court,

The changes proposed by the Rollers

were justified as "clarifying" the intent of the court so as to
eliminate the necessity of future hearings and friction between
the parties.

This is exactly the same posture as the change

proposed by Cornish.

Essentially, many of the amendments

proposed by the Rollers were no different than the amendment
proposed by Cornish; both were made for the purpose of further

clarification and to resolve remaining disputes between the
parties.
The Rollers have mischaracterized the actions of the trial
court.

The addition made to Finding No. 5, proposed by Cornish/

did not constitute a reversal or modification of a previous
finding.

The issue raised by the proposed amendment had not

previously been addressed by the trial court.

The new finding

made clear that while the tap in question was presently located
fifty feet west of the Rollers' residence, an interpretation of
the deed would not require that it remain in that position.
The amendment simply clarifies the obligation of Cornish with
respect to the deed.
Rollers also claim that Amended Finding of Fact No. 5 is
inconsistent with the trial court's original decree.
erroneous as pointed out by the district court.

This is

The district

court stated that the deed was silent as to where the 3/4 inch
tap had to be placed and that all the deed required was that
Cornish furnish the Rollers water from the Pearson spring
through a 3/4 inch tap.

The court also observed that while the

previous decree may have simply stated as a factual predicate
that the tap was presently located 50 feet west of the Roller
residence, it was not a requirement of the deed or previous
order that the tap remain there.
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(Transcript, p. 18)

The trial court's additional finding was also consistent
with the Supreme Court's decision affirming the literal language
of the deed.

Cornish proposed the amendment to seek clarifica-

tion of its long term obligations under the deed in light of
the Supreme Court's ruling in order to head off problems with
the Rollers in the future.
Furthermore, it is contrary to principles of judicial
economy to assert that the same judge who has presided over
this case for almost ten years could not make an additional
finding of fact in an attempt to resolve another disputed issue
between the same parties.

The alternative would have required

the filing of a new action to determine the location of the tap
right.

This would neither be in the interests of the efficient

administration of justice or in the interests of the parties.
The additional finding regarding the location of the 3/4
inch tap,was clearly within the authority of the trial court.
If the trial court had attempted to make additional findings
contrary to the mandate of the Supreme Court on remand, that
would be a different matter.

However, that is not the case.

The trial court instead considered an additional matter not
previously addressed by this Court.
This Court's decision made further consideration of the
language of paragraph 5 logical and appropriate on remand.
Where a judgment is reversed and remanded with instructions,
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the case stands in the lower court precisely as it did before a
trial was had in the first instance.

Hidden Meadows

Development Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979).
Where as here, part of a nonseverable judgment is reversed, a
final judgment is thereafter not present.

Hutchins v. State,

100 Idaho 661, 603 P.2d 995, 1000 (1979).

Thus, contrary to

Roller's assertion, there was no final judgment in effect upon
remand.
Lower courts are free to decide issues on remand so long as
they were not decided on a prior appeal.
U.S. 332, 347, n. 18 (1979).
Error § 992 (1962).

Quern v. Jordan, 440

See 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Appeal and

Any issue not disposed of on appeal is

left open for the trial court's reconsideration on remand.
Beltran v. Myers, 701 F 2d 91, 93 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 462
U.S. 1134 (1983).

In Hulihee v. Heirs of Hueu, 57 Haw. 387,

556 P.2d.920 (1976), the court found that on remand, the trial
court could determine findings of fact and conclusions of law,
with respect to issues not dealt with by the appellate court
and was not bound by its prior findings and conclusions.

If

additional facts are presented in further proceedings on
remand, findings as to matters not passed on by the appellate
court should be changed or modified in accordance with the
trial court's determinations based on the entire record.

Id.

Furthermore, a trial court may, after remand, correct an error
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in its original findings as to a matter not passed on by the
appellate court.
438 (1973).

Blinzler v. Andrews, 95 Idaho 769, 519 P.2d

In Blinzler, it was held not error where the trial

court on remand used a different formula for computing rental
value on land than that used in the original proceeding.

Id.

at 440.
In Hutchings, supra, the court stated that where part of a
nonseverable judgment is reversed, on remand the case is back
to the situation before judgment was improvidently granted and
the trial judge is free to retry any issues that had not been
specifically passed upon on appeal.

603 P.2d at 1000. See

also Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. National Distillers
and Chemical Corp., 354 F.2d 459 (2d Cir. 1965); Annot. Power
of Trial Court, On Remand for Further Proceedings, To Change
Prior Fact Findings as to Matter Not Passed Upon By Appellate
Court, Without Receiving Further Evidence, 19 A.L.R.3d 502
(1968).
Here, the trial court was not bound by its prior statement
in Finding of Fact No. 5.

The trial court had power to modify

or make an additional finding with respect to the location of
the tap.
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POINT TWO
ROLLERS1 ARGUMENTS THAT THE DISTRICT COURT
ERRED ARE ERRONEOUS. THIS COURT SHOULD
AFFIRM THE DISTRICT COURT.
A.

The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel is Inapplicable Here.
The principal argument advanced by the Rollers is that the

doctrine of issue preclusion bars the amendment of Finding of
Fact No. 5.2
the amendment.

The doctrine of collateral estoppel does not bar
Collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation

of issues in a second action that have been once litigated and
determined in another action.

Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme,

Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983).

In this case, there is

neither a second action nor a prior determination on the issue.
In order for a prior decision to be used against a party to
preclude further litigation of an issue by the party, four
questions must be answered in the affirmative:

(1) Was the

issue decided in the prior adjudication identical with the one
presented in the action in question?; (2) Was there a final

^Rollers refers to issue preclusion as the doctrine of "res
judicata." There are two branches of res judicata—claim
preclusion and issue preclusion. The second branch, that of
issue preclusion, is properly referred to as the doctrine of
collateral estoppel. Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735
P.2d 287, 289 (Utah App. 1987). See also State v. Ruscetta,
742 P.2d 114 (Utah App. 1987). The Rollers argument is limited
only to this second branch of the doctrine of res judicata.
For purposes of clarity, respondents will use the term
collateral estoppel rather than res judicata in their brief to
address Rollers argument of issue preclusion.
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judgment on the merits?; (3) Was the party against whom the
plea is asserted a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication?; and (4) Was the issue in the first case
completely, fully and fairly litigated?
Searle, 588 P.2d 689, 691 (Utah 1978).

Searle Brothers v.
If any of these four

elements are not satisfied, then collateral estoppel is not
available.

Baxter v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 705 P.2d 1167,

1168 (Utah 1985).

In this case, Rollers must establish that

each of these requirements are met in order to apply the
doctrine of res judicata.

Three of the four requirements,

however, are not present.
1.
The Trial Court Never Addressed the Issue of Where the
Tap Should Be Located Prior to the November 15, 1988 Hearing.
Collateral estoppel requires that the factual issue decided
in the prior action is the same factual issue presented in the
second action.
(Utah 1983).

Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226, 1230

Additionally, the issue actually litigated in the

first suit must have been essential to the resolution of that
suit.

Id.

See Copper State Thrift

387, 390 (Utah App. 1987).

& Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d

This Court has stated that the

issues actually litigated in the first action must be "precisely the same as those raised in the instant action" in order
to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel. Wilde v.
Mid-Century Ins. Co., 635 P.2d 417, 419 (Utah 1981).

See also

Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337, 1341 (Utah 1983).

Collateral

estoppel does not apply to issues that merely could have been
tried in the prior case, but operates only to issues which were
actually asserted and tried in that case.

International

Resources v. Dunfield, 599 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah 1979).
Rollers are incorrect in their assertion that the issue of
the location of the tap was litigated previously.

In the

original Findings of Fact, the court merely made a factual
observation that the tap was 50 feet west of the residence.
The judge did this because "you told me that's where it was."
(Transcript, p.18.)

The court did not address the issue of

whether the deed required the tap to be located at that spot.
This issue was never raised.

The location of the tap did not

become an issue until 1988. A fortiori, the location of the
tap was not essential to the issues actually determined
previously.
The relevant question dealt with in the original Findings
of Fact was whether Cornish had to provide the Rollers water
specifically from the Pearson Springs.

The prior findings do

not purport to rule conclusively on the location of the tap.
They simply

express the obvious—where the tap was currently

located.
In Schaer v. State, supra, the landowner instituted a suit
claiming that a road referred to as the "dugway road" was a
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public thoroughfare.

In a prior action in 1967, the plaintiff

argued that condemnation would deprive him of access to the
remainder of his property.

The plaintiff had only a possi-

bility of access via the dugway road.

The court made findings

of fact that there was no reasonable access to the remaining
property.

In the subsequent action, the state argued that

plaintiff's position in the 1967 litigation, that he was denied
reasonable access to his remaining property, implied a finding
that the dugway road was not a public thoroughfare and precluded
him from thereafter maintaining to the contrary.

This Court

held that the prior action never focused on whether the dugway
road was a public thoroughfare:
The trial court's findings of fact . . . do not
purport to rule conclusively on the status of the
dugway road "for all time." They simply express the
trial court's finding that, in 1967, there was no
"reasonable," "economical," or "feasible" access
available for use or development, nor was there a
likelihood of such in "the foreseeable future." One
of the uses for the land noted by the trial court was
"speculative," and there is nothing in its findings to
preclude another court twelve years later, from
finding that access is now reasonable, economical, and
feasible by way of the dugway road. In any event,
neither the findings nor the judgment entered in the
1967 case demonstrates that the court considered and
ruled on the precise issue in this case, namely,
whether the dugway road [was a public thoroughfare.]
657 P.2d at 1341.

Likewise, the court's prior Findings of Fact

here never focused on the precise issue of whether the deed
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required the tap to be located 50

feet west of the residence,

which the court subsequently determined it did not.
2.
A Judgment Reversed on Appeal is Not Considered Final
for Purposes of Collateral Estoppel.
The April 26, 1984 judgment of the district court was
reversed in part and remanded to the district court.

A judg-

ment which is reversed on appeal is not considered final for
purposes of collateral estoppel.
390.

Bruno, supra, 735 P.2d at

In this case, there is no prior final judgment to be

given preclusive effect.
action.

More importantly, there was no prior

Collateral estoppel is designed to bar a second action

on issues decided in a prior action.

In this case, there was

no second action but merely a continuation of the same case.
3.
The Issue of the Tap Location was not Fully,
Completely and Fairly Litigated Previously.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel also requires that the
issue was completely, fully and fairly litigated in the first
forum.

Searle, supra, 588 P.2d at 691.

In this case, the

issue of the tap location was not litigated at all previously.
Collateral estoppel applies, only to issues which were
actually asserted and tried in a prior case.
599 P.2d at 517.

Dunfield, supra,

If the material issue was not actually

asserted and determined, there is no basis upon which it can be
concluded that the party hac3 actually taken any position with
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respect to the issue and should now be estopped from asserting
a position in the present case. Dunfield, supra, 599 P.2d at
517.

The issue regarding interpretation of the deed with

respect to the location of the tap was not asserted and tried
earlier in this case and Cornish was appropriately not estopped
from raising this on November 15, 1988.
The Rollers cannot establish the elements of collateral
estoppel to require a reversal of the trial court's interpretation of the deed with respect to the location of the tap.

The

trial court appropriately addressed the issue of the clarification of the deed with respect to the location of the tap when
it was raised for the first time at the hearing on November 15,
1988.
B.

The Doctrine of Law of the Case Is Not Applicable Here;
The Trial Court did not Modify or Reverse a Previous Legal
Determination but Rather Made a New and Additional Finding
Justified by the Circumstances.
Rollers' argument that law of the case applies to prohibit

the trial court from amending Finding of Fact No. 5 is
erroneous.

In the instant case, the same judge that has

controlled the litigation over the course of several years,
simply made an additional finding after hearing the arguments
of counsel.
The case of Wheeler v. City of Pleasant Grove, 746 F.2d
1437 (11th Cir. 1984), cited by Rollers, is inapposite.
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In

that case, the district court entered new findings on remand
inconsistent with the circuit court's opinion.

The circuit had

reversed the district court's prior ruling denying plaintiff's
claim for damages and remanded for a determination of damages.
On remand, the district court still refused to award damages.
On a subsequent appeal, the circuit held that the district court
improperly engaged in a de novo determination of the damage
issue.

The court held that it had previously found that the

plaintiffs were entitled to damage and that the only question
on remand was the amount of damages sustained.

Id. at 1441.

Law of the case bound the district court to award damages.
The doctrine of law of the case is not applicable here.
Under law of the case, a decision on an issue of law made at
one stage of the proceeding becomes a binding precedent to be
followed at successive stages of the same litigation.

See

Conder v; A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634, 636
(Utah 1987).

Since law of the case deals with the application

of legal principles to particular facts, it does not prohibit a
new factual finding not previously considered by the trial
court.

Law of the case encompasses only those issues actually

previously determined.

Wheeler, supra, 746 F.2d at 1440.

Moore's Federal Practice, 1f 0.404[1] at 117 (1988).
trial court made a new factual finding.

See

Here, the

Cornish was not trying

to have the court decide again an issue it had already decided.
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While a decision of the appellate court establishes the law
of the case which must be followed by the trial court on remand,
this Court in the previous appeal did not decide any issue of
law applicable to the narrow issue addressed by the trial court
in amending Finding of Fact No. 5. Moreover, even if law of
the case could be correctly applied to this case, which it
cannot, law of the case applies only where the facts and issues
are substantially the same at the time of the subsequent
decision as they were at the time of the original decision.
This Court has recognized that where new facts are adduced, law
of the case may not be applicable.

See Richardson v. Grand

Central Corp., 572 P.2d 395, 397 (Utah 1977); see Board of
Education v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1033 (Utah 1983).
Unlike the court in Wheeler, in this case, the judge did
not make a finding inconsistent with this Court's previous
opinion. * The issue of the interpretation of the deed with
respect to the location of the tap was not previously determined and thus, no law of the case had been established.
Moreover, the mere recitation by way of background facts that
the tap was located 50 feet west of the residence in the
Findings of Fact entered in 1984, did not prohibit the court
from addressing the issue of whether the deed required the tap
to be located 50 feet west of the residence when it was raised
in 1988.

Facts and circumstances had changed in the four years
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since the original decision and the trial judge, who was
intimately familiar with the facts, appropriately did not
consider himself bound by his prior observation in the Findings
of Fact.
C.

Rollers' Reliance on Procedural Rules to Support Reversal
of the District Court Is Misplaced.
Rollers assert that Cornish violated Rule 4-501(7) of the

Code of Judicial Administration.

This rule indicates, however,

that a motion shall be in writing "unless made during a
hearing . . . " The purpose of this rule is to prevent surprise
and prejudice.

In this case, the Rollers were certainly not

prejudiced by the fact that this motion was made orally at the
time of the omnibus hearing.

Rollers responded to the motion,

made their objections known to the court and had a full
opportunity to be heard.
The Rollers' assertion that Rule 52 and Rule 59(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure prohibited the Court from making
the finding is also inapposite since these Rules contemplate a
final proceeding.

As previously set forth, once the Supreme

Court remanded the case, the court was free to consider its
prior order in light of this Court's decision.
D.

Rollers Were Not Deprived of Due Process by the Court's
Amendment.
Rollers assert for the first time on appeal that they were

deprived of due process by the court's granting of Cornish's
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oral motion to amend Finding of Fact No. 5.

The Rollers are

barred from raising this issue since it was not raised below.
Issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal.

See, e.g., Inslev Mfg. Corp. v. Draper

Bank & Trust, 717 P.2d 1341, 1347 (Utah 1986); Trayner v.
Cushing, 688 P.2d 856, 857 (Utah 1984).
Even if the due process claim were appropriately raised on
appeal, it should be denied.

The Rollers clearly had an

opportunity to be heard fully on the interpretation of the deed
with respect to the location of the tap.

The trial court's

consideration of this issue took a substantial amount of time.
(See Transcript, pp. 5-22.) Rollers1 counsel presented his
best case as to why the deed should not be interpreted as
Cornish contended.

Counsel made numerous statements about the

possible effect of the relocation of the tap on the quantity of
water the Rollers would receive.

The court considered the

arguments of counsel and ruled against the Rollers.

They

should not now be heard to complain that they were denied due
process.
POINT THREE
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE TRIAL COURT HAD
POWER UNDER RULE 60(b) TO MODIFY ITS FORMER
ORDER AND APPROPRIATELY DID SO IN THIS CASE
IN LIGHT OF CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES.
Rollers' assertion that the trial court had no power to
make the modifications sought by Cornish to the Findings of
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Fact for any reason except clerical error is incorrect.

The

Court has inherent equity power to modify or alter its prior
orders and judgments and that power may be invoked by motion or
by an independent action in equity.

Cornish sought to have the

court modify its prior order and make an additional finding.
As set forth above, the trial court was empowered to make
additional findings on remand since no final judgment was
present.

(See, Point One, supra)

In the alternative, however, even if a final judgment was
present, the trial court had power to revise its final order in
circumstances contemplated by Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Rule 60(b) provides in relevant part that:

On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court
may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order,
or proceeding for the following reasons . . . .
(6) . . . it is no longer equitable that the judgment
should have prospective application; or (7) any other
reasdn justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment.
Rule 60(b)(6)(7), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The trial court has power to modify its prior order pursuant
to Rule 60(b)(6) to eliminate the inequitable prospective
application of the court's order in light of changed circumstances.

In any situation where a judgment has prospective

application, relief may be given from its prospective features
when subsequent events make it no longer equitable that the
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judgment have prospective application.

7 Moore's Federal

Practice, 1f 60.26[4] at 60-262 (1987).
The trial court also had power to modify its prior order
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(7).

The rule allowing a trial court to

grant relief from a judgment or order for "any other reason
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment" provides
a reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a given case.
The Court's power to alter or modify its prior orders and
decrees is inherent.
equitable and just.

The rule contemplates relief that is
The rule providing for relief from

judgments should be liberally construed to enable courts to
vacate or modify judgments whenever such action is necessary to
accomplish justice.

0'Link v. O'Link, 632 P.2d 225 (Alaska

1981).
The thrust of Rule 60(b) is to allow the court that rendered
the judgment opportunity to change it when significant new
matters of fact or law arise which were not in existence at the
time the original order was issued.

See E.B. Jones Constr. Co.

v. Denver, 717 P.2d 1009 (Colo. App. 1986).

Granting of relief

from judgment is appropriate where there has been a change of
circumstances from those originally before the court. See,
e.g., Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 981 (Utah 1980).
In McCormack v. McCormack, 45 Or. App. 1111, 610 P.2d 290
(1980), the court reconsidered and amended a prior final
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order.

The court stated that the court had inherent power to

set aside or correct a previous judgment, upon a showing of
good cause to do so.

Id. at 292. The court stated that the

only limitation on the Court's inherent power to modify or
correct a previous judgment is that this power should be exercised within a reasonable time.

What is reasonable time for

this purpose is a matter within the discretion of the court.
Id.
Moreover, broad discretion is accorded the trial court in
ruling on the merits of a motion for relief from a judgment and
the Supreme Court will reverse that ruling only if it is clear
that the trial court abused its discretion.

Russell v.

Martell, 681 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1984); Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671
P.2d 224 (Utah 1983).

The court may exercise wide judicial

discretion in weighing the factors of fairness and prejudice to
the parties.
If this further finding by the trial court is construed as
granting relief under Rule 60(b), it was clearly within the
trial courts discretion to grant the relief requested by
Cornish.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons outlined above, Cornish submits that the
Court should affirm the amendment by the trial court to
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Paragraph 5 of the Amended Findings of Fact dated December 15,
1988.
DATED this ™

day of July, 1989.
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